Traditional game theoretic analysis proposes backward induction as a model of rational behavior in games with perfect information. However, counterintuitive results have cast doubt on the predictive power of the theory. For example, in the Centipede Game, experimental evidence shows that subjects' behavior significatively differs from what the theory expects. In our paper, we construct a dynamic model based on the Centipede Game. Our claim is that the source of these discrepancies between theory and experimental evidence can be explained by appealing to some form of bounded rationality. Traditional game theoretical analysis could then still accurately predict the players' behavior, provided that they are given time enough to appreciate the strategic environment in which they operate. We prove convergence to the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome for any monotonic continuous-time selection dynamics (Nachbar (1990)). By introducing perturbations, we also show that such adjustment processes are intrinsically unstable, and study how this instability is positively related with the length of the game. JEL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER: C72, C79.
INTRODUCTION
Inspired by the works of Nachbar (1990) and Cressman (1996) on the Prisoner's Dilemma, this paper explores the properties of an evolutionary model based on the Centipede Game, first introduced by Rosenthal (1981) In the class of games we investigate, the use of backward induction (or alternatively, the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies) selects a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. This equilibrium requires the two players to adopt the strategy of opting out at each information set. Since the game is characterized by a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, the latter is also trembling-hand perfect (Selten (1975) ) and proper (Myerson (1978) ) when you consider the appropriate normal forms. Moreover, every other Nash equilibrium of the game is outcome-equivalent to the subgame-perfect strategy profile. All the most popular solution concepts therefore appear (for once!) to agree on a unique outcome. However, there are clear benefits to the players if, for some reason, they deviate from this prediction: both are always better off if the game continues for at least two more stages. This backward induction paradox has been the focus of a debate about the logic and the rationale of backward induction. Recent papers include Aumann (1995) , Battigalli (1997 ), Ben Porath (1994 , Binmore (1996) and Reny (1993) . The urgency of this debate is underlined by the experimental literature which confirms that subjects deviate substantially from subgame-perfection when the number of stages is sufficiently large. Recent papers include, among others, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) , Nagel and Tang (1995) and Roth and Erev (1995) . 1 How can we justify such a discrepancy between theory and intuition? Rosenthal's (1981) original proposal is to assume that players treat finite noncooperative games with perfect information as stylized single-person decision problems in which the behavior of other players is modeled as chance moves that reflect intuitively plausible behavior rather than strictly rational behavior. Backward induction is then applied in the modified game. In Rosenthal's example, the probability a player assigns, at each information set, to the event that the opponent will choose a suboptimal action is chosen is negatively related to the payoff difference between the optimal and the suboptimal action. Under these conditions, the players may well decide to select a strategy which does not require to opt always out, at least for the first stages.
The aim of this paper is to explore the backward induction paradox in the Centipede Game with evolutionary techniques. In the model, the two players are assumed to adjust their (mixed) strategies according to a continuoustime Monotonic Selection dynamic (Nachbar (1990) ). This condition requires that the relative frequency of fitter strategies should increase at the expense of less fit competitors. 2 The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a formal description of the N-legged Centipede Game. Section 3 sets up the dynamical system as a continuous-time Monotonic Selection dynamic.
Section 4 explores the asymptotic properties of such dynamics for the N-legged Centipede Game. If the initial conditions lie in the relative interior of the state space, any Monotonic Selection dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium (Theorem 4.1). Since all Nash equilibria of this game are outcome-equivalent to the unique subgameperfect equilibrium, players adjusting their behavior according to any Monotonic Selection dynamic will therefore eventually behave as though using backward induction, regardless of their initial behavior. The proof of Theorem 4.1 is an application of Nachbar (1990) and Cressman's (1996) results on the finitelyrepeated Prisoner's Dilemma, which show that the Replicator Dynamic (probably the most commonly known and studied Monotonic Selection dynamic) converge to one of the Nash equilibria of the game from any interior initial condition. Like the finitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the Centipede Game is weakly dominance solvable. Samuelson and Zhang (1992) have shown that any Monotonic Selection dynamic converges to the solution of strictly dominance solvable games from any interior initial condition, although counterexamples exist which show that the same property does not generally hold for games which are only weakly dominance solvable. 3 Our paper describes a class of games in which the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies leads to a solution which is outcome-equivalent to the strategy profile selected by a popular class of evolutionary selection dynamics.
Section 5 is devoted to simulations based on the type of dynamics studied here. In the 3-legged Centipede Game, we see orbits that start close to the Nash equilibrium component, then move away from it and eventually come back. In other words, even though Theorem 4.1 guarantees convergence, we show cases in which it is not monotonic. Borrowing the term from Binmore et al (1989) we refer to this phenomenon as unlearning. Although the players seem to understand backward induction initially, because they mostly opt out immediately, they gradually learn that they can earn more by opting in at the first move, and it is only after they have learned to opt out at the third and then the second stage, that they return to opt out at the first stage.
Is such mimicking of the backward induction procedure more likely to occur the longer is the Centipede? This problem is related to the local stability properties of the subgame-perfect equilibrium, that is, the properties of the vector field characterizing the dynamic process sufficiently "close" to the subgame-perfect strategy profile. In an independently conducted study, Cressman and Schlag (1995) analyse conditions for convergence and stability for the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of games with perfect information without relevant ties, of which the Centipede is a special case. In the case of the Replicator Dynamic they provide a sufficient condition for local 2 There is a growing literature which explores the conditions under which dynamics analogous to that studied here can approximate a learning adjustment process. See, among others, Börgers and Sarin (1993) , Cabrales (1993), and Schlag (1994) .
3 As explained later in (4.2), we only consider dominance relations between pure strategies. On the behavior of pure strategies strictly dominated by mixed strategies, see Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) .
(asymptotic) stability of the backward induction outcome which they call simplicity. In their terminology, a simple Centipede Game must have at most three legs. The intuition they provide is the following: if the Centipede has more than three "legs", then learning how to select the subgame-perfect outcome might be difficult, and boundedly rational players might persist in playing strategies that are not justified if the backward induction procedure is applied correctly, even if this sort of behavior disappears in the long run.
Their analysis leaves open the qualitative features of the adjustment process (i) when the learning dynamics are slightly "perturbed" and (ii) in the case of longer Centipede Games. We tackle this problem in the following way.
We run simulations of a modified version of the dynamic analysed in Section 4 using a perturbed version of the Replicator Dynamic which "forces" the players to adopt a completely mixed strategy, regardless of their initial behavior, and no matter how each strategy performs against the current opponent's profile. Following Binmore and Samuelson (1995) , this perturbation is called drift. Its role is to open the model to the possibility of a heterogeneity of behaviors, which we think reasonable in social environments populated by boundedly rational agents. 4 The source of this heterogeneity is left unmodeled here; following the standard literature in the field, we attribute the drift to unexplained mutations, and simply check how the model reacts to the introduction of such a perturbation.
In the three-legged Centipede Game, with sufficient drift, the unlearning phenomenon is so enhanced that the dynamic exhibits limit cycles. Even with less drift, cyclic behavior can be sustained for long periods of time when the game is "long". Increasing the length of the game also has the effect of increasing the average payoff of the players. This effect is not predicted by backward induction, but is consistent with the experimental evidence in the field. We interpret such trajectories as cycles of learning. The existence of such cycles would seem to support Rosenthal's intuition that backward induction will not predict the play of agents who do not reason perfectly. Section 6 summarizes the conclusions.
2. THE CENTIPEDE GAME.
The aim of this section is to provide a simple characterization of the N -legged Centipede Game. It is a 2-player game with perfect information and N moves that alternate between players. The formal condition associated with the so-called "centipede structure" is that there exists an information set such that the set of its predecessors (including itself) coincides with the set of decision nodes of the game. This particular feature allows us to adopt the following notation:
{I,II} denotes a generic player, with -i indicating her opponent; N is the number of 'legs' of the centipede (we assume N > 1);
Q is the set of stages of the game, i. e. Q {1,..., N + 1} 5 ; u i : Q AE ¬ is the payoff function for player i , that is the reward she receives when the game ends at stage q ; q OE Q .
We now look at the payoff ranking. We require that, at any stage, both players are better off if the game continues for more than one stage:
Condition (2.1) formalizes a natural property of the Centipede Game: the player who is entitled to move has always an incentive to opt in, conditional on the opponent doing the same in the following round. However, opting out is always optimal if the opponent is doing the same in the following stage:
where d i q is a Kronecker delta function which equals 1 when i and q are either both even or both odd, and 0 otherwise. To complete the description of the game, we need to define the strategy set for both players. We introduce the following restriction: we group together all the equivalent pure strategies, i.e. the strategies for each player that lead,, to the same probability distribution over the terminal nodes for all the pure strategies of the opponent. In other words, we shall consider only the strategy sets of the reduced normal form: We also need to specify the relation between a generic (pure) strategy profile, and the corresponding outcome. This is formalized by means of the outcome function v:S AE Q which has the following properties:
in fact, as can be seen by looking at the extensive form of figure 2.1, the outcome of the game is determined by the player who decides to opt out first. 6 6 With another abuse of notation, we use the symbol u i not only for the function u i :Q AE ¬ , but also the compound function v u i . In this latter case, the symbol u i (s I ,s II ) will indicate the payoff received by player i given the strategy profile (s I ,s II ) .
The N -legged Centipede Game
We quote, for the sake of reference, the following standard results, the proofs of which are omitted: PROPOSITION 2.1. The N -legged Centipede Game exhibits the following properties:
A unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, namely
A (unique) component, that is a closed and connected set, of Nash equilibria with the common property that player I plays strategy s I 1 with probability 1.
Throughout the paper, the symbol NE will denote such a component, the exact characterization of which clearly depends on the length N of the Centipede.
The game has another property of interest which can be summarized as follows. If J is the player who moves in the last stage of the game (i. e. J i OE {I,II}d i N = 1 { } ), then J has an incentive to opt out at this stage. Hence, opting in at the last stage, i.e. s J N +1 , is a weakly dominated strategy. It follows that the game is (weakly) dominance solvable, in the sense that it can be reduced to a single cell (the subgame-perfect outcome) by the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Unlike in other weakly solvable games, there is a unique way of following this procedure, which leads to a unique outcome: at each stage, only the player who currently has the last move has a weakly dominated strategy that can be deleted, thereby reducing the game to a shorter Centipede Game, to which the same argument can be applied inductively.
THE DYNAMICS
We now move on to the characterization of the evolutionary dynamics we analyze. We formalize players' behavior in terms of the mixed strategy they adopt at each point in time. Let r i q (t) be the probability with which player i selects her pure strategy s i q at time t , with r i (t) r i denote the set of completely mixed strategies of i .
ASSUMPTION 3.1. The evolution of r(t) is given by the following system of continuous-time differential
We refer to the autonomous system f f I ,f II
term that captures the relevant forces that govern the players' strategy revisions. Some terminology is needed to specify the necessary assumptions on f :
• DEFINITION 3.1. f is said to yield a regular dynamic if the following conditions are satisfied:
exists and is finite.
These regularity assumptions make the growth rates
continuous on the state space D . Moreover, they imply that (3.1) has a unique solution from any initial state which leaves D , as well as D 0 , invariant:
We can interpret (3.2) as a "no creation/no extinction" property: any pure strategy which is played with positive probability at time zero will also be played in any finite time interval. On the other hand, if a strategy is not played at time zero, it will never be used.
So far, no formal link between the selection dynamic and the payoffs has been proposed.
• DEFINITION 3.2. A Monotone Selection (MS) dynamic is a regular dynamic which satisfies the following condition:
What forward invariance implies in our context is that the system (3.1) possesses an inertial component: no pure strategy can be extinguished within a finite time. On the other hand, the monotonicity condition (3.3)
captures the essence of a selective evolutionary process: given the mixed strategy profile played at each point in time, more successful pure strategies grow faster than poorly performing ones. Throughout the paper, we make the following assumption: ASSUMPTION 3.2. The dynamic is MS.
MS DYNAMICS AND THE CENTIPEDE GAME
In this section, we examine the asymptotic properties of any MS dynamic when initial conditions lie in the relative interior of the state space D :
Assumption 4.1 excludes the possibility that selection neglects to take account of some strategies. If non interior initial conditions were considered, given that the system is forward invariant, the dynamic would act only on a subset of the strategy set S (i.e. on a game which might be qualitatively different from the game object of study).
Since the Centipede Game is weakly dominance-solvable, we begin by specifying the relation between weak dominance and the asymptotic behavior of any MS dynamic. In a finite normal form game if it yields a strictly smaller payoff against any mixed strategy in the support of the opponent: 
We introduce a weaker notion of dominance that is only required to hold along the solution path: hereafter) if we can identify a timet and a nonempty compact set C -i Õ D -i for which:
3) holds and we replace (4.4) by the following:
where, by analogy,
Let w i (r(0)) be the w -limit set for player i of an interior solution r r(0),t ( ) ; i.e.
The following proposition holds:
(4.10)
is always defined and positive for any
is a positive, continuous, decreasing function of t and bounded below by 0, so it must
" s -i OE w -i (r(0)). Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that there exists some s -i OE w -i (r(0)) such that
• , and some positive constants e and D t such that
In view of (4.7),
˜ is a negative number bounded away from 0 infinitely often, since also the difference of growth rates is a Lipschitz continuous function of r(t) defined over the compact set C -i , which preserves the same sign of
). This implies that there must be another positive constant g e such that:
which leads to a contradiction, as the improper integral (4.11) does not converge. 7 
Then, the result follows, since, by (4.3-5): converges to a positive constant, this implies that both pure strategies must yield the same payoff against any mixed strategy in the w -limit set of the opponent. Finally, (4.10) ensures that the weak t -dominance relation is transitive. Proposition 4.1 tells us that the extent to which the intuition "domination implies extinction" holds is related to the relative performance of the two strategies in the limit, that is, when t AE• . 9 In particular, to ensure extinction, we need strict dominance, even if in the weaker form of t -dominance:
We omit to consider the constant of integration in the improper integral (4.11), as the integral does not converge. 8 See Cressman's (1996) , Theorem 3.1, and Nachbar's (1990) Lemma. 9 It is important to notice that lim PROOF. Since C -i is a compact set, there exists some g e > 0 such that
an argument analogous to that used to prove (4.9), it follows that lim
Proposition 4.2 generalizes the standard result of the extinction of strictly dominated strategies to the case of pure strategies which are only strictly t -dominated. The intuition behind the two results is exactly the same: if the relative performance of a pure strategy is uniformly worse than another, and this property still holds in the limit, this implies the extinction of the dominated strategy, regardless of any further consideration. We apply The results so far apply to all finite normal form games. However, if we restrict our attention to the Centipede Game, we can refine the result of Proposition 4.1iv) on the transitivity of £ t : 
To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that S -J (N -1) can be ordered by £ t , since S J (N -1) = S J (N). We evaluate the payoff difference
u -J (N) and u -J (N + 1) enter (4.16), since s -J N +1 and s -J N -1 yield the same payoff against any pure strategy in which J opts out before stage N -1. Moreover, the sign of (4.16) depends only on the sign of the term in round brackets of the right-hand side of (4.16), since, by forward invariance, r J N (t) > 0," t 0 . Define k > 0 by
, that is, the threshold value of r J N +1 (t)
r J N (t) that makes player -J indifferent between
s -J N -1 and s -J N +1 . Taking limits in (4.16) we therefore obtain that following:
. By (4.7), L J N +1 is finite. There are only two possible alternatives:
Since this exhausts all cases, the result follows. 10 STEP 2. 1 £ q < N . Assume that the lemma is true for 1 £ q < N . Let i be the player who is required to move at stage q . When 1
To prove the lemma, it is sufficient to show that S -i (q -1) is an ordered set, since S i (q -1) = S i (q ). For a fixed q , let ˆ J (q ) index the pure strategy of player i which weakly t -dominates all other strategies in S i (q ) (i.e. s i
q -1 , r i (t)) takes the following form:
where all the terms
q . There are two possible cases:
, by analogy with CASE B.
10 It might be argued that we are not allowed to determine the limiting sign of (4.17) looking only at the term into round brackets of the right hand side, since r J N (t) might go to zero faster than r J N +1 (t)
However, this possibility is ruled out by the fact that, by (4.7), L J N +1 is finite.
To show this, notice that the result is obviously true if ˆ J = q , since this would make
Given that r i q (t) r iˆ J (t) converges to a positive constant, (4.9) implies that:
(4.20)
In other words, the relative performance of s i q must eventually improve, compared with any other strategy in S i (q ). Thus, for t sufficiently large, also
is the only strategy in S i (q ) against which s -i q -1 does better than s -i ¢ q . From the above consideration we have that x i q (t) must converge to 0 from above, which in turn implies, by analogy with CASE A,
Since this exhausts all cases, the result follows.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1. Since S I and S II are completely ordered by £ t , (4.8) implies that lim
exists for any i,q and ¢ q . If all the ratios converge, then the mixed strategy profile must also converge. We can therefore apply the standard result that "convergence implies Nash" in the case of MS dynamics (see, e. g. Weibull (1995) , Theorem 5.2 (c)) to complete the proof.
Theorem 4.1 shows that the Nash equilibrium component denoted by NE is globally interior attracting, that is, it attracts every interior path under any MS dynamic. Note that the above result is not directly linked with any local stability property of the set NE: it may well happen that trajectories starting close to NE move away, and then eventually come back. This is exactly what happens in the Centipede Game. In the next section, we shall explore this phenomenon using simulations.
«CYCLES OF LEARNING»: SOME SIMULATION RESULTS
This section is devoted to simulations of the dynamics studied hitherto. To perform this task, we shall begin by specifying the payoff structure, as well as the dynamics:
ASSUMPTION 5.1. The payoff function is as follows:
, with a > 1; (5.1)
In words: the payoff of player i is multiplied by some positive constant a after every other round. We can interpret a as a measure of the increasing returns to cooperation in the Centipede Game, since it reflects how much the payoffs increase as the game ends further away from the beginning of the tree. This section makes a step in the direction of realism by abandoning the pure selection assumption of (3.4) which is replaced by the following ASSUMPTION 5.2. The evolution of r(t) is given by the following system of continuous-time differential
. These dynamics are a linear combination of the standard Replicator Dynamic and a perturbation term which ensures that, at each point in time, every pure strategy is played with positive probability, no matter how it performs against the opponent's mixed strategy. Following we call the latter drift. Such a deterministic perturbation term can serve as a high probability approximation to a stochastic noise term in a model in which time is discrete and the population size is finite 11 , as we approach the limiting case of continuous-time and infinite population suitably. The relative importance of the drift for player i is measured by l i , which we refer to as the drift level. We assume l i to be "small", since the major forces which govern the adjustment process should be captured by the unperturbed dynamic. We shall analyze the 2-legged Centipede Game of figure 5.1 first.
11 Models which fall into this category are, for example, those of Kandori et al . (1993) and Young (1993) . In a biological context, the noise may be interpreted as a mutation, i. e. a random alteration of the agents' genetic code. In a learning context, it can be interpreted as a mistake, i. e. a random alteration of the agents' behavior, or as an effect of the players' experimentation. We prefer the terminology of drift (as opposed to noise) because the latter is usually modeled as a genuine random variable, whereas the former takes the form of a purely deterministic dynamic. For a general discussion on motivations and general properties of evolutionary dynamics with drift, see Samuelson (1997) , Chapter 6.
In figure 5 .1 x and y denote the probabilities with which the corresponding pure strategies are played, and
The phase diagrams of figure 5.2 trace some interior solutions of the unperturbed Replicator Dynamic (i.e. when l I = l II = 0 ) under two different realizations of the payoff parameter a . a = 2 a = 4 r II 2 (t) , and therefore x , is strictly decreasing for t 0. Whenever x falls below 1 a 2 + a + 1 , the threshold level of x which makes player I indifferent between her two pure strategies, r I 3 (t) starts to fall, until it vanishes in the limit. For any interior solution, s I 3 is in fact a strictly t -dominated under the Replicator Dynamic (although it is not strictly dominated in the conventional sense) and this implies, as we know from Proposition 4.2, that lim
As r I 1 (t) AE 1 the (expected) payoff difference between s II 2 and s II 3 tends to zero, as both strategies yield the same payoff against s I 1 . In consequence, the evolutionary pressure against the weakly dominated strategy s II 3 vanishes, and this is why s II 3 remains in the support of the limiting play.
Consistently with Theorem 4.1, every interior trajectory converges to the Nash-equilibrium component NE , highlighted by a bold segment in the upper-left corner of the two diagrams of Figure 5 .2. Increasing the payoff parameter a has the following effects: i) NE shrinks, i.e. the measure of states compatible with the Nash prediction is reduced;
ii) the dynamic speeds up (this is because in the Replicator Dynamic, as well as in any MS dynamic, growth rates are increasing functions of payoff differences).
It is interesting to note that both effects are qualitatively consistent with McKelvey and Palfrey (1992)'s experimental results on the Centipede Game, for which our model may provide a theoretical account. 12 We move on to the 3-legged Centipede Game of figure 5.3. Table IIA , p. 808, they call f q the observed frequency of games ended at stage q . They show that the corresponding cumulative distribution over the terminal nodes F q , in the case of the HIGH treatment, stochastically dominates the distribution derived from the LOW treatments. In other words, when payoffs are higher, the game ends, on average, "closer" to the subgame-perfect outcome. However, if we look at the data in more detail, we discover that this evidence is due to the fact that in the last five repetitions (out of a series of ten) the cumulative distributions of the HIGH treatment consistently dominate the corresponding distributions derived from both the LOW payoff sessions, whereas this never happens if we look at any of the first five repetitions. In other words, not only do higher payoffs produce more learning, but they do so at a faster rate. We obtain a similar result if we estimate the mixed strategies, for both players, consistent with the observed frequencies at each node. In the last five repetitions, the cumulative distributions of the HIGH treatment stochastically dominate the relative distributions of both the LOW payoff treatments, showing a less dispersed behavior compared with the subgame-perfect strategy profile. 13 Hereafter all the simulations are characterized by a =2. Figure 5 .4(a) refers to the unperturbed Replicator Dynamic. As we know from Theorem 4.1, any interior path converges to NE (the bold segment in the bottom-right corner of the diagram). Whenever x is sufficiently high (see, for example, the point ¢ A in the diagram) the system converges to NE monotonically . This happens whenever player II adopts an initial behavior which is sufficiently close to the subgame-perfect prediction (that is, when r II 2 (0) is sufficiently high). Otherwise, as with the trajectory starting from the point labelled A in the diagram, we can observe the following pattern:
• A AE B : player II opts in often enough to induce player I to increase the probability of playing both strategies s I 3 and s I 4 which yield a higher payoff. Player II then has a clear incentive to play s II 4 , which is the reason why x decreases significantly. At the point labelled B , the system is sufficiently close to the pure strategy profile s I 4 ,s II 4 ( ) to consider this as the cooperative phase;
• B AE C : this is the beginning of what we may consider to be the backward induction phase. Now x is too small for player I not to discriminate between s I 3 and s I 4 . The probability of playing the latter increases gradually at the expense of the alternative options (and the system moves toward the point C in the diagram, corresponding to the pure strategy profile s I 3 ,s II 4 ( ));
• C AE D : now it is player II who modifies her behavior significantly because player I is now opting out with a sufficiently high probability whenever the last node is reached,. The system moves gradually toward a position characterized by the strategy profile
• D AE E : x is sufficiently high to make s I 1 optimal compared with any alternative option: r I 1 (t) is therefore bound to increase until the process eventually converges to NE.
The behavior of the dynamic with drift is reported in figure 5 .4(b). In this first example we set l i =.001 and
, for any i,q . In other words, drift is "negligible" and uniformly distributed across players and strategies. The only significant difference between figures 5.4 (a) and 5.4(b) is that, whenever the system gets sufficiently close to NE, the drift component overcomes the selection dynamic, pushing the system toward the (unique) restpoint denoted by F. 14 In other words, the dynamic with drift of figure 5 .4(b) is characterized by an additional phase:
• E AE F : the system eventually reaches the unique restpoint, in which I plays s I 1 with probability (almost) 1
and II mixes (although not sufficiently to induce I to come back into a new cooperative phase). In our interpretation, this latter phase is driven by a pure drift effect, which does not have, in this first example, a significant impact on the play in the limit (in fact, whenever I opts out at the first stage with sufficiently high probability, II 's behavior is completely irrelevant in determining the outcome of the play). For this phenomenon to appear, we do not need the special parameter setting of figure 5.5, although we need a drift against the subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy that is stronger for player I than for player II. Why should it be so? If drift reflects players' experimentation, it is then reasonable to assume this effect to be stronger in the case of player I, whose subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy precludes any observation of the opponent's reaction. If drift reflects the fact that players make mistakes (or misperceive the game) a similar argument applies: as in Rosenthal (1981) , it may well be that the probability of a mistake is higher for actions which stop the game further away from the end of the tree.
What happens when the length of the Centipede increases? Figure 5 .6 shows different diagrams summarizing the behavior of (5.3) under different specifications of the parameters N and l i . 15 As the diagrams illustrate, raising the drift level l has the following effects: i) cycles persist, and are more frequent, the longer is the Centipede;
ii) the average length of play (and therefore, the average payoff) increases. When the drift is no longer to be considered "negligible" (though "small") for both players, the cyclic behavior observed in the three-leg case persists over time. Not being able to provide a formal analysis of these dynamics, our simulations leave open the question of whether such qualitative behavior is bound to disappear in the long run. If it does not disappear, we may be observing limit cycle behavior equivalent to that of figure 5.5.
CONCLUSIONS
The results contained in the paper suggest two different (and possibly antithetical) conclusions. Theorem 4.1 establishes a strong link between the dynamic outcome of a popular class of evolutionary dynamics and the traditional game-theoretical analysis of games with perfect information. Moreover, in the special case of the Replicator Dynamic, our simulations suggest that the actual learning path might resemble the backward induction procedure in a closer way. If the initial conditions are sufficiently "mixed" (i.e. if the players' initial behavior gives sufficient weight to the pure strategies which require to opt out at the latter stages) the adjustment process closely replicates the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies prescribed by the backward induction procedure, and the players act as if they experience the procedure step by step, until equilibrium is achieved. On the other hand, as the simulations of longer Centipede Games suggest, one only needs a small perturbation of the adjustment process to generate a cyclic behavior (this latter effect being stronger the longer is the Centipede).
These results are to be compared with the approach proposed by Cressman and Schlag (1995) , to which our paper relates in several ways. In their Theorem 2, Cressman's (1996) technique is applied to show that, in the case of games with perfect information and no relevant ties (of which the Centipede Game is a special case), every interior path of the Replicator Dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. The key argument is contained in their Theorem 1, which our Proposition 4.1 generalizes to any MS dynamic, as both results rely only on weakdominance considerations. Moreover, their result on the (in)stability of the subgame-perfect outcome in "complex" games is consistent with our simulation results of the Replicator Dynamic with drift.
In addition, our simulations offer an evolutionary spin on Rosenthal's (1981) original analysis of the Centipede Game. The drift modeled in our simulations has similar effects to the "trembles" each player considers in her calculations: it is negligible when the selection dynamics are in action, but it becomes crucial in shaping the adjustment process as the latter approaches the NE component. A (more remote) analogy could be also established with the treatment of the finitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma proposed by Kreps et al. (1982) . In their model, the players consider an enriched model, by means of a game with imperfect information, where some other view of what is rational is taken into account, including possible scenarios off the equilibrium path. In our case, the assumption of a completely mixed drift term makes D 0 forward invariant: at any point in time (as well as in the limit) every pure strategy must be played with positive probability.
